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Security is one of the major concerns of every
industry in the world today. One of the best ways of
hacking into a computer system is brute forcing. And with
the increase in computing, brute forcing has become faster
and easy to do.
Text-based passwords are still the most popular and
most commonly used form of authentication even though the
requirements for a good password are still increasing.
Research has shown that the best text-based passwords are
the random ones that have no sequence or pattern to them.
But this also makes it difficult to remember. Well-

documented research has shown that it is easier to remember
an image than words, hence the adage “A picture is worth a
thousand words.”
Even though there are good policies for text-based
passwords, the unpredictability of users’ attitudes and
behavior has most of the time rendered these policies
inefficient. The common trade-off for the complexity of
text-based passwords is recallability. Most users would
prefer to use a password they can easily remember than a
complex one that they can easily forget.
One of the proposed alternatives to text-based
passwords is graphical passwords. There are several schemes
that have been proposed but are still unpopular.
This thesis investigated one of these schemes that are
used on mobile devices to determine whether it can be used
as an alternative to text-based passwords. Also this
research proposes ways to improve this scheme and options
of bringing it at par with the current minimum requirements
of a good text-based password.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The number one concern of every organization in the
world is the security of its assets. Depending on the value
of the asset, the security level can range from a password
to encryption keys, biometric scanners, and so on. “The
number of mobile workers is rapidly increasing and most
mobile workers will be relying on their smart phones in the
course of their work” (Landman, 2010, p. 145). This can be
true for other mobile devices such as laptops, tablets,
etc.
In a centralized system, intrusion and unauthorized
access to the system is easily detectible since there is
constant monitoring of the system by the information
technology personnel. The same cannot hold true for most
personal computer systems (desktops, laptops, tablets,
smart phones, etc.).
According to the research of Shay et al. (2010) on the
habit and attitudes of computer users, “nearly 80% of users
based their password on a word or name, with special
1

characters added to the beginning or end” (p. 12) despite
the implementation of a new policy to check for dictionary
words. Hence there has been a lot of research into the use
of graphical-based passwords. One such password is the
Android Unlocking Pattern (AUP), which instead of entering
a numeric PIN to unlock the screen, a user must connect
several dots to unlock their android mobile device.

Statement of the Problem
The fundamental problem of every security personnel is
how to authenticate the users of the systems securely and
conveniently (Shay et al., 2010). “A common problem with
password-based methods is the low entropy available in
user-chosen passwords, which may be used by an attacker to
mount password-guessing attacks” (Halevi & Krawczyk, 1999,
p. 231). Due to the unpredictability of user-chosen
passwords, to determine the entropy of a user-chosen
password is challenging, but the entropy of a text-based
password can be calculated assuming the characters were
randomly generated.
In recent years, a number of devices and techniques
have been proposed including smart cards, RFID cards,
USB tokens, and graphical passwords to make
authentication more usable, convenient, and secure.
While each of these technologies has its advantages
and may be well suited for use in a specific
environment or for a specific application, text-based
2

passwords remain the most commonly used authentication
mechanism. This is in part because text-based
passwords require no special hardware and are easy for
end users to input and for system developers to
implement. (Shay et al., 2010, p. 1)
Text-based passwords are still the most commonly used
method of authentication. “To combat both the inherent and
user-induced weaknesses of text-based passwords,
administrators and organizations typically institute a
series of rules—a password policy—to which users must
adhere when choosing a password” (Shay et al., 2010, p. 1)
Even with the implementation of policies to make text-based
passwords more secure, they can still be unpredictable
because the behavior of users is still unpredictable.
Without feedback from security experts, users created
their own rules on password design that were often
anything but secure. Dictionary words and names are
the most vulnerable forms of passwords, but many users
do not understand how password cracking works. (Adams
& Sasse, 1999, p. 42)
To counteract this issue, most security systems employ
persuasive methods to guide the users in the choice of
their passwords. One of these methods is the establishment
of rules that predict the strength of the password.
Some users also result to writing down their passwords
or choose very simple passwords that would be more easily
broken due to frequent password expirations as reported by
Adams and Sasse (1999).
3

According to several studies in learning in education,
combining a visual aid with the human body’s motor sensors
(doing an activity) promotes learning and better recall for
students. Hence there has been a lot of research into the
use of graphical passwords as an alternative to text-based
passwords. Graphical passwords can provide the complexity
needed for passwords and yet can also be easily recalled.

Hypothesis
Van Oorschot and Thorpe (2008), in their investigation
of the Draw-A-Secret (DAS) graphical password scheme,
defined the complexity of a DAS based on the password
length, number of components, and symmetry. DAS is similar
to AUP in that they both allow the user free reign to
determine his or her authentication pattern. Hence the
objects or pattern of a user’s AUP is not known until
drawn.
Unlike DAS (which uses a canvas), an AUP uses a grid
of dots that need to be connected. But by increasing the
size of the grid, can an expanded AUP (eAUP) provide better
security than a text-based password? Van Oorschot and
Thorpe (2008) suggested a method to predict and model a
number of classes for systems where passwords are created
solely from a user’s memory. They hypothesize that these
4

classes define weak password subspaces suitable for an
attack dictionary. “For user-drawn graphical passwords, we
apply this method with cognitive studies on visual recall”
(Van Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008, p. 1).
The research of Van Oorschot and Thorpe (2008) was
based on the Draw-A-Secret (DAS) scheme proposed by Jermyn,
Mayer, Monrose, Reiter, and Rubin (1999). “We introduce a
set of user-drawn graphical password complexity properties,
including: password length, number of components, and
symmetry. We model what we conjecture to be classes of
higher-probability user-drawn graphical passwords based on
these complexity properties” (Van Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008,
p. 3).
Hence, a hypothesis can be constructed as follows: By
modifying the parameters of an AUP and a method to
determine familiar or common patterns, an eAUP scheme can
provide the same level of security as a text-based
password.

Research Question
From the hypothesis, the research question can be
constructed as: Can an eAUP provide the same level of
security as a text-based password?

5

Purpose of the Study
In order for graphical passwords to replace text-based
passwords, they need to offer the same level of, if not
more, complexity and difficulty in hacking it. Increasing
the complexity of the graphical password will make it
difficult to crack. Also a predictive model will help
prevent the use of familiar patterns that can easily be
hacked. Furthermore, increasing the parameters of the AUP
scheme can provide the same level of security as a textbased password scheme.
Hence, the main purpose of this research was to change
the parameters of an AUP (to create eAUP) to increase its
complexity. This was done to determine whether it was equal
or better than a text-based password. Additionally, the
study proposes a theoretical model for determining common
patterns such as spirals, zigzags, polygon, squares, and
rectangles in a constructed pattern using the geometric
properties of these shapes.

Significance and Justification of the Study
The complexity of text-based password requirements has
grown, making it increasingly more difficult for users to
remember. Several studies have shown that although users
are aware of the security concerns, their habits can still
6

make a systems security vulnerable.
According to the studies of McDowell, Rafail, and
Herman (2009) and Shay et al. (2010), the major trade-offs
of password complexity are easy recall, so users tend to
modify old passwords to create new ones, write them down,
or share their passwords over time.
Bragdon et al. (2010) found that users of the game
“Gesture Play” had an improved short-term recall. Userdrawn graphical passwords combine two important qualities
for recall: motor sensory and visual sensory. This research
is a contribution to the ongoing research of graphical
passwords, which can be a suitable alternative to
graphical-based passwords.

Limitation and Delimitations
Due to time constraints, this research is limited to
proposing a theoretical model for detecting familiar
patterns such as squares, rectangles, spirals, and zigzags.
This is to prove that a model can be constructed for userpattern choices using the geometric properties of familiar
patterns. Correspondingly, in calculating the Space,
Entropy, and minimum Length of a pattern for an eAUP
scheme, known functions with slight modifications will be
used to accommodate the structure of an eAUP scheme.
7

This research can be expanded to include a brute-force
test of the eAUP as well as the construction of a working
model of the eAUP to tests its usability in real time.
Also, the modified equations are prone to errors, and
further studies may be required to prove their accuracy.
Furthermore, this research can also be expanded to
cover the detection of other common and familiar patterns
such as regular polygons, arcs, etc.

Assumptions
The following assumptions were made in the calculation
of the entropy of an eAUP grid:
1. A dot cannot be used more than once.
2. A stroke follows an order in the direction of the
stroke. Hence dots D1 follows D2 in an ordered system.
3. Let N represent the space (the number of all
possible passwords of length not greater than a specified
character length in a symbols set).
4. For an eAUP, grid size represents the total number
of dots (that is, the horizontal length of the grid X the
vertical length of the grid) divided by the length of a
stroke (Van Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008).
5. Let H be the entropy of a character of a random
password.
8

Definition of Terms
The following terminologies are used in this context
in the research:
1. Space refers to the maximum possible dots that are
available in an eAUB.
2. Entropy is the measure of uncertainty of a random
dot selected in the grid.
3. Dot is a spot in the grid.
4. Stroke is a straight line connecting two or more
dots in the grid.

Validity
“The main motivation for graphical passwords is the
hypothesis that people are better at remembering images
than artificial words” (Dirik, Memon, & Birget, 2007, p.
20). The formula and functions that were used in collecting
data are a modification of similar ones that were used in
the calculations of similar values in previous research
into other graphical passwords.
The formula and functions used in this research are
similar to the ones used by Barker and Kelsey (2012),
Chiasson, Stobert, Forget, Biddle, and Van Oorschot (2012),
Passfaces Corporation (2012), Esteban, Morales, Pardo, and
Menendez (1994), Halevi and Krawczyk (1999), and Komanduri
9

and Hutchings (2008) in their research. Even though DAS
allows the construction of discontinued shapes, the same
functions and formula can be applied to eAUPs.

Organization
This thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter 1
is the general introduction to the research. Chapter 2 is
the literature review. Chapter 3 describes the variables
and methodology used to collect the data, and Chapter 4
presents the analysis and discussion of the data.

10

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
Technology has turned the world into a global village.
Increasingly, research is being made into discovering ways
to improve the global communication. After a few clicks of
a mouse, one can access information that decades ago would
have required an individual days of rummaging through
library books to find. However, advancement in technology
has created several issues in security for experts. One of
the major concerns is the weak link of the user to a
system. According to most researchers, human beings in a
system have been recognized as the weakest link in computer
systems security (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Sasse, Brostoff, &
Weirich, 2001).
According to Vidyaraman, Chandrasekaran, and Upadhyaya
(2008), there are two categories of legitimate users dubbed
“the enemy within.” For the first category, although they
do not have any malicious intent, their actions cause
security breaches, whereas for the second category, dubbed
11

the “saboteur,” they are legitimate users with malicious
intent. Even though they possess legal credentials, their
goal is to disrupt the system such as sabotaging, stealing
information, etc.
According to Shay et al. (2010), in their research
into “user attitude and behavior towards stronger password
requirements,” users’ attitude and behavior compromise the
relevance of the security policies. For this reason, lots
of research has been done into how to reduce the effects of
the “weakest link” in security systems, the user.
Several research areas that studied solving this issue
include but are not limited to implementing stricter
security policies, increasing the complexity of the
existing security protocols, and discovering alternative
methods for security.
One of the proposed alternative methods is the use of
graphics-based passwords as substitutes for the traditional
username and text-based password combination. “Visual
objects seem to offer a much larger set of usable
passwords” (Dirik et al., 2007, p. 20). According to Zhang,
Monrose, and Reiter (2010), users tend to vary their
passwords by changing a few characters from the old
password or use the name of a familiar object such as high12

school name, hometown name, or the name of someone close to
them such as spouse, children, parents, and so on.

Purpose
The purpose of this literature review is to explore
other research into graphics-based passwords and how they
compare with a traditional username and alphanumeric
password combinations in computer security. There is a lot
of research in the recall ability of graphic-based
passwords versus alphanumeric passwords, as well as the
usability of graphical-based passwords.
This research compares pattern-drawn graphic passwords
similarly found on the android mobile devices with
alphanumeric passwords. The main focus of this will be to
propose ways of increasing the strength of a user-drawn
pattern password based on the space, entropy, and minimum
length of pattern-drawn passwords. Also, this research
proposes ways of eliminating easily guessable passwords.

Source and Search Criteria
The sources for previous work and research related to
this research were selected from a comprehensive search in
several journals and article databases. The online journals
that were used include ACM Digital Library, IEEE
13

Publications and Journals, EBESCOhost, ProQuest, and Wiley
Online Library. The “Google” search engine was also used to
expansively acquire tributary sources for amplification of
the lexicons used in the reviewed literature.
The following terms were used fundamentally to search
for articles and other publications on the subject of this
research.
Password strength:

According to McDowell et al.

(2009), a password strength is a password’s degree of
resistivity to guessing and brute-force attacks. In this
research, password strength is a function of its space,
density, and randomness.
Graphical passwords: A graphical password is a
password that requires the user to remember an image,
picture, or pattern-based information instead of text-based
information (Van Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008). For the purpose
of this research, graphical-based passwords is used to
refer to user-drawn passwords (UD) (Van Oorschot & Thorpe,
2008), picture passwords (Komanduri & Hutchings, 2008),
click-based graphical passwords (CBG) (Forget, Chiasson, &
Biddle, 2007, 2010), persuasive cued click-points (PCCP)
(Spitzer, Singh, & Schweitzer, 2010), cued gaze-points
(CGP) (Forget et al., 2010), and pass-point password
14

schemes (Dirik et al., 2007).
Authentication: According to the RSA information
security glossary, authentication is a procedure where a
person or a computer program verifies their identity in
order to access information (Czekalski, 2012).
Text, text-based, and alphanumeric passwords:
Represent passwords that use ASCII and other forms of
characters, which include but are not limited to alphabets,
numbers, and other symbols.

Users’ Behavior and Attitude Toward Passwords
One of the major problems in computer security is “how
to authenticate a user securely and conveniently” (Shay et
al., 2010, p. 1). “Authentication is typically the first
step toward confirming that a user is authorized to perform
a requested action, be it retrieving email, withdrawing
money from an ATM, or issuing commands to a powerdistribution grid” (Shay et al., 2010, p. 1). Even though
text-based passwords still remain the most commonly used
method of authentication, user behavior and attitude make
it unpredictable.
Shay et al. (2010) conducted research on the attitude
of users towards new password policies at Carnegie Mellon
University (CMU). They analyzed the difference between the
15

old and new policies and also the attitude of the users to
these new policies. Their study provided new insights into
the behavior and attitudes of users towards strict password
policies. These insights are outlined as follows:
1. Users find new requirements annoying but believe
they provide security.
2. Some users struggle to comply with new password
requirements.
3. Users are more likely to share and reuse their
passwords than to write them down.
4. Users tend to modify old passwords to create new
ones.
5. Users are more likely to share their passwords over
time (about 25% had shared their passwords with at least
one person).
6. Use of dictionary words and names are still the
most common strategies to create passwords (about 80% of
the participants had passwords based on names and
dictionary words).
In concluding, they realized that the results were
inconsistent with some of the assumptions of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). “NIST bases
its per-password entropy estimates on several assumptions
16

that are inconsistent with our findings” (Shay et al.,
2010, p. 12).
However, if their population sample was from an
academic demography, it raises the question of whether it
is the same demography that NIST based their assumptions
on.
According to Sasse et al. (2001), even though text
passwords are required to be memorable and secured, “most
passwords are either memorable but easy-to-guess or secure
but difficult-to-remember” (Stobert, 2010, p. 4304).
Usually users tend to choose between memorability and
security. For example, it will be easier for a user to
modify an existing password to make a new one than to
create a new password from scratch, since it will be easy
for the user to remember a slightly modified password than
a newly created one.
“Two common techniques for helping people to remember
complex passwords are to use pass phrases and
substitutions” (Holt, 2011, p. 37). For example, a pass
phrase such as “My birthday is first January 2001” can be
represented as a password as “Mbdi1j01,” and in using
substitutions, a user can replace the letters of a word
with the letters that appear above it on the keyboard. For
17

example, “Friday” can be represented as “t49rw7.” However,
users tend to use the same password for several sites
(Sasse et al., 2001), hence once the password is determined
for one site, it may be applicable to several other sites.

Background of Graphical Passwords
Several graphical password schemes have been produced
on the premise that an image is easier to remember than
text-based passwords (Dunphy & Yan, 2007). Dirik et al.
(2007) classify password systems as: (a) Recognitionbased systems (RBS); (b) Cued recall-based systems
(CRBS); and (c) Pure recall-based systems (PRBS).

Recognition-Based Systems
In this type of password system, a user must
recognize a set of previously selected set of images,
symbol, or icons from a large collection for
authentication (Dirik et al., 2007). An example of an RBS
scheme is Passfaces (a commercial scheme).
Passfaces is a scheme where user authentication is
done by selecting a set of pre-selected facial images out
of a stock of images (Dunphy, Heiner, & Asokan, 2010).
Research into a mobile implementation of this scheme used
varying entropies to determine the user’s attitudes
18

towards this type of scheme on mobile devices.
Though their survey was short-termed (they
recommended a longitudinal study), it provided helpful
insight into real-world performance levels expected of
recognition-based schemes. Although their method of
calculating the entropy was not stated, it is assumed
that they used Shannon’s method (Shannon, 2001). Also,
their observations showed that the choice of facial
images was influenced by the ethnicity of the user.

Cued Recall-Based Systems
Human recall of long-term memory is usually tied to
an activity or event. Hence, capturing these events in
the form of pictures or other visual form can be used as
a roadmap to recalling otherwise “lost memory” (Gyorbiro,
Larkin, & Cohen, 2010a, 2010b) CRBS passwords employ the
use of images to aid recall of passwords. To
authenticate, a user selects several points on an image
or a series of images as a password (Chiasson, Forget,
Stobert, Van Oorschot, & Biddle, 2009; Chiasson et al.,
2012; Stobert, 2010a; Stobert, Forget, Chiasson, Van
Oorschot, & Biddle, 2010b). A sample password scheme that
uses CRBS is a passpoint password.
“A PassPoints password is a sequence of points,
19

chosen by a user in an image that is displayed on the
screen” (Dirik et al., 2007, p. 20). Another example is
the “persuasive cued click-points” (PCCP) (Chiasson,
Forget, Biddle, & Van Oorschot, 2008; Chiasson et al.,
2012) which is similar to the passpoints.
Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP) is a click-based
graphical password system in which a user is
presented with a number of images in sequence, and is
asked to choose one click-point on each image. The
first image is assigned by the system, but each
subsequent image in the sequence is determined by the
user’s previous click. This means that clicking in
different places on an earlier image leads the user
to different next images. (Stobert, 2010, p. 4304)
Calculating the theoretical space of a PCCP,
according to Stobert (2010, p. 4304), was based on the
following formula: w is the width of the image, h is the
height of the image, t is the size of the tolerance
square, and c is the number of click points.

Pure Recall-Based Systems
A PRB can be defined as a password system where “a
user is asked to reproduce something (e.g. a drawing or a
sequence of actions) that he or she created or selected
earlier during the registration stage” (Suo, Zhu, & Owen,
2006, p. 742). The main reason behind PRB systems,
according to Jermyn et al. (1999), is that they “have shown
that there is a substantial improvement of performance in
20

recall and recognition with pictorial representations of
to-be-remembered material than for verbal representations”
(p. 3).
The most popular PRB system password scheme is the
Draw-A-Secret (DAS) scheme. The DAS uses a canvas that has
a grid of cells. Each cell has a coordinate (h,w) where h
is the horizontal value and w is the vertical value. A
password of the DAS consists of the cells that an image or
a drawing passes through (Jermyn et al., 1999).
According to Jermyn et al. (1999), two factors that
make DAS strong are: (a) Users do not pick passwords
uniformly, and (b) An attack does not have a significant
knowledge of the user’s password distribution.
AUP is similar to DAS but, unlike DAS, cell or dot (in
AUP) repetition is not possible. Oorschot and Thorpe (2008)
contributed to this password scheme by introducing a model
for predicting weak passwords. In computing the space of a
DAS, Jermyn et al. (1999) assumed that passwords of a
length greater than a certain length had a probability of
zero.

Definition of Variables
Password Space
A password space may be described as the set of all
21

possible character combinations as a function of the number
of characters and the maximum length of the password
(Jermyn et al., 1999; Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2005; Van
Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008). The size of the password space
has an upper bound and a lower bound. The upper bound size
is the number of all possible characters. The calculation
of the lower bound size varies depending on the type of
password scheme.
For RBS passwords, Suo et al. (2006) computed the
password space as:
𝑚

�
𝑙=1

(𝑛 + 𝑙 − 1)!
−
𝑙! (𝑛 − 1)!

(1)

where n is the total number of pictures, l is the password
length, and m is the maximum password length, assuming that
a picture can be selected more than once.
For PRBS passwords, Suo et al. (2006) proposed that if
the drawing is allowed to pass through multiple units or
pixels, then the maximum password space can be computed as:
𝑚

� 𝑛𝑙 −
𝑙=1

(2)

However if the scheme does not allow the drawing to
pass through the same pixel or unit multiple times, then
the minimum space is computed as:
22

𝑛

�
𝑙=1

𝑛!
−
(𝑛 − 𝑙)!

(3)

Minimum Length
The minimum length of a password for a password scheme
is the minimum number of character sequence needed to
achieve a given password strength (entropy) in bits
(Chiasson et al., 2008; Dunphy & Yan, 2007; Forget et al.,
2010; Jermyn et al., 1999; Komanduri & Hutchings, 2008;
Yokota, Ootsu, & Baba, 2007).
Using the information-theory entropy based on
Shannon’s entropy (Shannon, 2001), the minimum length can
be computed as follows:
𝐿=

𝐻
−
log 2 𝑁

(4)

where H is the desired entropy and N the number of possible
passwords (“Password Strength,” 2012).
The minimum length of a password is needed to
determine the least number of characters in a password
needed to achieve certain strength.

Entropy
The entropy is a statistical parameter which measures
in a certain sense, how much information is produced
on the average for each letter of a text in the
language. If the language is translated into binary
23

digits (0 or 1) in the most efficient way, the entropy
H is the average number of binary digits required per
letter of the original language. (Burr, Dodson, &
Polk, 2006, p. 46)
The National Institute of Standards and Technology
also defines entropy as a degree of the disorder,
uncertainty, or unpredictability in a closed system (Barker
& Kelsey, 2012; Burr et al., 2006; Komanduri & Hutchings,
2008; Milton & Kennedy, 2010; Wong & Chen, 2006; Zhang et
al., 2010)
Information entropy, usually used as a measure (in
bits) for the strength of a password, is a concept from
information theory which implies that for a password of
strength 64 bits will require 264 attempts during a brute
force search to exhaust all possibilities (“Password
Strength,” n.d.).
Shannon (2001) describes entropy as a measure of
uncertainty and hence proposed that:
𝑁

𝐻(𝑁) = − � 𝑝𝑖 log 𝑝𝑖
𝑖=1

−

(5)

where pi is the probability of a sequence occurring in a
space. Milton and Kennedy (2010) suggested that the
frequency fa of a symbol a in an arbitrary list of N symbols
will vary and hence pa =

𝑓𝑎�
𝑁.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY AND INSTRUMENTATION

Introduction
This research and its instruments are designed to
measure the strength of an eAUP password based on the
space, minimum length, and entropy. This method helped me
answer the question: Does an eAUP have the comparable
strength and complexity of a text-based password?

Type of Research
The methodology for this study is a comparative
experimental quantitative research design. This method was
selected because in order to determine what parameters of
an eAUP meet the minimum strength of the current text-based
password standard, the minimum length, the space, entropy,
and strength of the eAUP need to be computed. The purpose
of this research design was to enable me to compute the
entropy, space, and minimum length of all possible eAUPs.
This design was also selected because of its
usefulness and versatility in aiding me to manipulate
variables to achieve the desired results.
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Hypothesis
There are three dependent variables and one
independent variable, which is the screen resolution. Hence
the null hypothesis is identified as follows:
H0: The space N, entropy H, and minimum Length Lmin of a
text-based password are equal to the space N, entropy H,
and minimum Length Lmin of any eAUP.
Mathematically,
𝑁𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 = ∀ 𝑁𝑒𝐴𝑈𝑃 and 𝐻𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 = ∀ 𝐻𝑒𝐴𝑈𝑃 and 𝐿𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 = ∀ 𝐿𝑒𝐴𝑈𝑃

The null hypothesis will be rejected if the level of

significance is below 0.05.

Definitions of Functions in eAUP Password
Figure 1 shows a 10-by-10 eAUP grid.

Figure 1. A sample grid.

An eAUP consists of a grid of h * v dots (D) (since
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the dimension of the grid may be a square or rectangle)
that can be connected to each other; h is the number of
horizontal dots and v is the number of vertical dots.
Hence, the size of the grid can be computed. Theoretically,
an eAUP password can be defined as a set of interconnected
strokes (s). Therefore, the Length (LeAUP) of an eAUP
password can be determined as the number of strokes in the
password.
Mathematically:
𝐿𝑒𝐴𝑈𝑃 = ∀𝑠

− (6),

where ∀𝑠 = number of strokes in the pattern.

Since a stroke (s) is a line connecting two or more

dots (D), the minimum size (mins) of a stroke is two Ds and
the maximum possible size (maxs) is maximum (m,n)D, where it
is possible to connect a straight line across the longest
side of the grid. Since the mins can be a subset of maxs of
a stroke and the size of mins = 2, then the number of mins
in maxs can be computed as:
(𝑁�𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠) =

𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠
�2� ≅ ℵ

− (7)

where, ℵ means rounded down to the nearest whole number,

since mins cannot be a single dot. Hence the shortest stroke
smin can be a line between two neighboring Ds. If a dot is
defined by the horizontal position h and vertical position
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v in the grid as (h,v), then its neighbors can be any
possible combination of {D(h-1,v), D(h-1,v+1), D(h,v+1), D(h+1,v+1),
D(h+1,v), D(h+1,v-1), D(h,v-1), D(h-1,v-1)}. Hence the length of an
eAUP password can be defined in terms of minD as:
𝐿𝑒𝐴𝑈𝑃 = 𝑛 (𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐷 ) −

(8)

From the fourth assumption, the number of strokes n in
a grid is mathematically represented as,
𝑛=

(𝑚 × 𝑛)
𝑡

−

(9)

where 𝑡 = (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐷 + �������
𝐷1 𝐷2 )2 . The entropy (Yokota et al.,

2007) of a random character in a text-based password is
defined as:
𝐻=𝐿 ×

log 𝑛
log 2

−

(10)

Using extended ASCII characters and the current
password policy of a minimum password length of eight
characters,
N = 218 for printable extended characters
L = 8 characters
then, H = 62.1454745982154, approximately 64 bits.
Therefore 64 bits can be used as a baseline to calculate
the minimum length of strokes needed by any grid to satisfy
the required strength of a character in a space N in any
grid.
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Instruments for Computing Variables
Minimum Length for H
Given the entropy, the minimum length of characters in
a space can be computed as:
𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐻� log 𝑛
(
)
log 2

−

(11)

The length of a stroke in an eAUP password cannot be
pre-determined since users can be unpredictable, therefore
it will range between mins = 2 and maxs which depends on the
longest side.
Space
Since the longest stroke can be expressed in terms of
the smallest stroke (2 dots), the mins is used to compute
the total space. Also, eAUP does not allow the same dot to
be used multiple times, thus using the minimum password
space for PRBS, the space of eAUP is computed as:
𝑛

𝑁= �
𝑙=2

𝑛!
(𝑛 − 𝑙)!

−

(12)

N is computed to the nearest lower bound whole number.

Entropy
Due to the nature of an eAUP, it is assumed that the
probability of selecting a dot is dependent on the
immediately preceding dot. We therefore get the Shannon
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formula for calculating the entropy of a character
(Shannon, 2001), which is
𝑛

𝐻(𝑋) = − � 𝑝(𝑥𝑖 ) log 𝑏 𝑝(𝑥𝑖 )
𝑖=1

−

(13)

Even though Shannon’s entropy is not fitting to
compute the entropy of an eAUP (due to the continuous
nature of eAUP patterns), it is used in this research for
simplicity. A more appropriate method is Markov’s m order
data process (Hornbeck, 1975; MacRae, 1977). Markov’s
first-order data process (where 𝑝(𝑥𝑖 ) log 𝑏 𝑝(𝑥𝑖 ) is the

probability mass function of outcome xi and n the space) is:
𝐻 = − � 𝑃(𝐷𝑛−1 ) � 𝑃(𝐷𝑛 ) log 2 𝑃(𝐷𝑛 )
where,

𝐷𝑛−1

𝐷𝑛

−

(14)

P (Dn-1) = probability of previous dot and P (Dn) is the
probability of D occurring (Schmidt, Wählisch, & Gröning,
2011).
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION

Design
Using the screen resolution of popular screen sizes, a
theoretical grid was created that covered the entire
screen. It was assumed that a dot had a diameter of 5
pixels and each dot is 10 pixels apart. This gave off a
square tolerance of 15px * 15px equivalent to a square
tolerance area of 225 pixels. See Appendix A for the code
of the grid. The size of the smallest screen was 640 by 480
pixels (VGA), and the size of the largest screen was 2560
by 1600 pixels (WQXGA). The entire screen was used,
assuming that the entire screen can be a canvas for the
eAUP grid.
A stand-alone java application was used to compute the
values for analyzing the eAUP grid. See Appendix A. The
application was executed on an Intel i5 core computer with
8GB RAM. The difficulty in constructing a real eAUP grid
was overcome by employing this alternative method.
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Setup
The resolutions of 22 different screen types were used
as parameters for application. Table 1 shows the types of
the screen and their resolutions.
Table 1
Types of Screens and Their Resolutions

Screen

Resolution

VGA

640 X 480

SVGA

800 X 600

WSVGA

1024 X 600

XGA

1024 X 768

XGA+

1152 X 864

WXGA

1280 X 720

WXGA

1280 X 768

WXGA

1280 X 800

SXGA

1280 X 960

SXGA

1280 X 1024

HD

1360 X 768

HD

1366 X 768

SXGA+

1400 X 1050

WXGA+

1440 X 900

HD+

1600 X 900

UXGA

1600 X 1200

WSXGA+

1680 X 1050

FHD

1920 X 1080

WUXGA

1920 X 1200

QWXGA

2048 X 1152

WQHD

2560 X 1440

WQXGA

2560 X 1600
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Results
Due to my limited computing capabilities, the password
space for the eAUP grids could not be computed. See
Appendix B.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the number of dots
in the height and width of the screens.

Height and Width Distribution
180

Number of strokes (mins)

160
140
120
100
80

Length

60

Height

40
20
672
1060
1360
1734
2166
2040
2167
2252
2720
2890
2295
2320
3255
2880
3180
4240
3920
4608
5120
5168
8160
9010

0
Size n of the grid

Figure 2. The height and width distribution of the screens.

While the number of strokes in the length of the grid
increased steadily, the number of strokes dropped along the
graph due to the decrease in the resolution for those
screens.
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The initial assumption of this research was that the
size of the grid will follow a linear trend. However, from
Figure 3, the data show that the size of the grid follows a
polynomial of the order of 5, which may be due to the
fluctuating of the screen resolutions.

Size of Grid (strokes)
10000
y = 0.0157x5 - 0.781x4 + 15.919x3 162.74x2 + 935.01x - 205.98

9000
8000
7000
6000

Size of Grid (strokes)

5000

Poly. (Size of Grid
(strokes))

4000
3000
2000
1000
8160

5120

3920

3180

3255

2295

2720

2167

2166

1360

672

0

Figure 3. The size of the grid in terms of strokes.

However the entropy for a pattern of length 8 mins for
the screens follows a linear trend on the line y = 1.0237x
+ 79.364. See Figure 4.
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Entropy(8)
120
100
80

y = 1.0237x + 79.364

60

Entropy(8)
Linear ( Entropy(8))

40
20
0

Figure 4. The trend of the Entropy of patterns of length 8
minimum strokes.

Figure 5 shows that the graphs for the Lmin follow a
power trend where the base is approximately
approximately -0.093. Hence given H,
𝐿min

𝐻
≅ ( )−0.093
8
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𝐻
8

and power is

60

Length in strokes

50

y = 54.957x-0.091

Lmin H= 64

40

Lmin H= 128

30

Lmin H= 256
y = 27.195x-0.089

20

y = 13.899x-0.097

10

y = 6.9667x-0.095

0

Lmin H= 512
Power ( Lmin H= 64)
Power ( Lmin H= 128)
Power ( Lmin H= 256)
Power ( Lmin H= 512)

Size of Grid n

Figure 5. The minimum length in strokes.

Detecting Familiar Shapes
Matte and Warren (2006) describe a line segment in
geometry as a line that is confined by two distinct end
points, and contains every point on the line between its
end points. From the definition, a stroke can be a line
segment between dots

where DS is the beginning dot with

position Ds(hs,vs) and DE is the ending dot with position
DE(hE,vE).
It is assumed that all strokes in the grid are
straights lines that are horizontal, vertical, or diagonal
at an angle of 45o. This will cause all strokes to connect
all dots within points Ds and DE. Another assumption is that
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once a dot is used by a stroke in a grid, it cannot be
reused as a starting dot of a stroke or an ending dot to a
stroke. Also, the end dot is determined when the direction
of the stroke changes. The change in direction can be any
one of the following: vertical up (↑), vertical down (↓),
horizontal left (←), horizontal right (→), diagonal up
right (), diagonal up left (), diagonal down left (),
and diagonal down right ().
Additionally, a middle stroke s can have only two
neighboring strokes since the pattern is drawn continuously
except the starting stroke (the first stroke in the
pattern) and ending stroke (the last stroke in the
pattern), which can have only one neighbor. The neighbor sn
of a stroke s is such that the beginning or ending dot of
sn is equal to the starting or ending dot of s.
Mathematically,
𝑠 ∩ 𝑠𝑛 ≠ ∅

−

(15)

However, for the starting stroke s, a neighbor sn is
such that,
𝑠
𝐸𝐷

(ℎ𝐸 , 𝑣𝐸 ) =

𝑠𝑛 (ℎ
𝑠𝐷 𝑆 , 𝑣𝑆 )

−

(16)

𝑒
𝐸𝐷

(ℎ𝐸 , 𝑣𝐸 ) =

𝑒 (ℎ
𝑠𝐷 𝑆 , 𝑣𝑆 )

−

(17)

And the reverse is true for the ending stroke e such
that,
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Even though the pattern is open-ended meaning,
𝑒
𝐸𝐷

𝑠 (ℎ
𝑠𝐷 𝑆 , 𝑣𝑆 )

(ℎ𝐸 , 𝑣𝐸 ) ≠

−

(18)

the pattern can have vertices for closed shapes like
squares, rectangles, triangles, and more. Hence a vertex
dot Dv can be:
1. DV such that it is the starting dot Ds and ending
dot DE of two neighboring strokes such that:
𝐷𝑣 =

𝐷𝑆 =

𝐷𝐸

−

(19)

2. Also DV is the intersection of two non-neighboring
strokes such that:
𝑆𝑚 ∩

𝑆𝑛 =

𝐷𝑣

−

(20)

In order to detect common or familiar shapes and
patterns, I used the existing properties of these shapes to
detect their existence in an eAUP password.
Square
A square is a four-sided regular polygon with all
edges equal, all internal angles are 90°, and whose
position on the coordinate plane is determined by the
coordinates of the four vertices (corners) (Page, 2012).
Figure 6 shows a sample square with vertices ABCD.
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A

B

D

C

Figure 6. A square ABCD.

Using the properties of a square, a square pattern
ABCD can be found in a pattern if,
1. All dots between vertices {DA, DB, DC, DD} are
active.
2. |AB|=

|BC|=

|CD|

=

|DA|

3. <ABC= <BAC= <BCD= <CDA=90°
4. |AB|

‖

|CD| and |BC| ‖ |AD|
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Rectangle
A rectangle is similar to a square except that only
the two parallel line segments are equal. Figure 7 shows a
sample rectangle with vertices ABCD.

Figure 7. A rectangle ABCD.

Using these properties, a rectangle in an eAUP can be
detected based on the following conditions:
1. All dots between vertices {DA, DB, DC, DD} are
active.
2. |AB|=

|CD| and

|BC|

=

|DA|

3. <ABC= <BAC= <BCD= <CDA=90°
4. |AB|

‖

|CD| and |BC| ‖ |AD|
Zigzag

A zigzag is a shape made up of small corners at
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variable angles, though perpetual within the zigzag,
outlining a route between two parallel lines; it can be
defined as both jagged and fairly regular (“Zigzag,” 2012).
Zigzags can be irregular, but due to time constraints, this
research was limited to only regular zigzags, which can be
traced through two parallel lines and the alternating line
segments are parallel to each other.
To find the angle between strokes in a pattern, the
Euclidean calculations can be used (Weisstein, 2012). For a
zigzag pattern to be detected, the dot products of all
neighboring lines need to be computed. Assuming two
neighboring strokes are denoted by s1 and s2 where s1 is
bounded by |Ds1De1| where Ds1 = (hs1, vs1) and De1 = (he1, ve1).
Then,
∆ℎ𝑠1 = ℎ𝑠1 − ℎ𝑒1

-

(21) and

∆𝑣𝑠1 = 𝑣𝑠1 − 𝑣𝑒1 1

-

(22)

s1 = (hs1, vs1)

-

(23)and

s2 = (hs2, vs2)

-

(24)

Hence,

Applying Euclidean calculations, an angle 𝜃 between s1

and s2 is

cos 𝜃 =

(∆ℎ𝑠1 − ∆𝑣𝑠1 ) × (∆ℎ𝑠2 − ∆𝑣𝑠2 )
|∆ℎ𝑠1 − ∆𝑣𝑠1 | |∆ℎ𝑠2 − ∆𝑣𝑠2 |

-
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(25) hence,

(∆ℎ − ∆𝑣𝑠1 ) × (∆ℎ𝑠2 − ∆𝑣𝑠2 )
�
𝑠1 − ∆𝑣𝑠1 | |∆ℎ𝑠2 − ∆𝑣𝑠2 |

𝜃 = cos −1 � |∆ℎ𝑠1

- (26)

Assuming that Dv1 is the dot that connects s1 and s2,
Dv2 is the dot that connects s2 and s3, and Dv3 connects s3
and s4. Then to detect a zigzag, there must be a change of
direction at each of the dots (in opposite direction) of
each of the strokes at an angle of about 𝜽.
Discussion and Conclusion
The formulae used in this research may be error-prone,
but they give significant results that can help guide
future research into an eAUP scheme. From the two-way t
test = 6.36033E-09 on space and entropy, there is no
significant difference between the grid size n and the
entropy H of a password of length 8. Hence the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Even though each stroke is made of a straight line, by
increasing the grid, the length of the minimum stroke can
be reduced so that they can be used to construct curves
within the grid.
Future work that can be done includes considering the
continuous nature of the pattern in the calculations of
space and entropy. Another potential research area is using
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the grid to draw Asian characters as passwords within the
grid.
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APPENDIX A

CODE USED FOR COMPUING RESULTS
Grid.java
/**
* source of integration function is:
*
http://introcs.cs.princeton.edu/java/93integration/Trapezoi
dalRule.java.html
* @author Joseph Abandoh-Sam
*/
public class Grid {
private
private
private
private

int m = 0;
int v = 0;
int size;
String name = null;

public Grid ( String name,int mtemp, int ntemp){
this.name = name;
m = mtemp/15;
v = ntemp/15;
size = (m * v)/2;
//System.out.println(size);
}
public int getM(){
return m;
}
public int getV(){
return v;
}
public String getName(){
return this.name;
}
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public double f(double x){
//return (Math.log(x)/Math.log(2));
return (1/x )* (Math.log(1/x)/Math.log(2));
}

//from
private double integrate(double a, double b, int N) {
double h = (b - a) / N;
// step size
double sum = 0.5 * (f(a) + f(b));
// area
for (int i = 1; i < N; i++) {
double x = a + h * i;
sum = sum + f(x);
}
return sum * h;
}
public int getSize(){
return size;
}
//returns the space for the grid.
public long getN(){
double sum = 0;
for(int l = 2; l <= Math.max(m, v); l++){
sum = sum + (factorial(size)/factorial(size l));
}
return Math.round(sum);
}
//returns the min number of strokes for
public long Lmin (int H){
return Math.round(H/(Math.log(size)/Math.log(2)));
}
//calculate the factorial of a number.
private double factorial (int n){
double fact = 1;
if (n <= 1) {
return 1;
}
else {
for (int i=1 ; i<=n; i++){
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fact = fact*i;
System.out.println(fact);
}
return fact;
}
}
public int entropy(int l){
int H = 0;
for(int i = 0; i <= l; i++){
//H = H + ((1/(size-i)) * l * ();
}
H = (int) (l * (Math.log(size) /
Math.log(2)));//(int)integrate(2,size, size-2);
//double sum1 = 0.0; // the two summations in the
equation.
return H;
}
}
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Running.java

/**
* Calculate the values for each grid
* @author Joseph Abandoh-Sam
*/
import java.io.*;
import java.util.Scanner;
import java.util.logging.Level;
import java.util.logging.Logger;
public class Running {

private static Grid grid;
public static void initialize()throws Exception{
//fstream = new FileWriter("input.txt");
//out = new BufferedWriter(fstream);
}
public static void main (String args[]){
//grid = new Grid(100,100);
Scanner sc = null;
int m = 1024, n = 768;
try {
sc = new Scanner(new
FileReader("D:\\test\\grid_input.txt"));
sc.useDelimiter(" ");
} catch (FileNotFoundException ex) {
Logger.getLogger(Running.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE,
null, ex);
}

grid = new Grid(args[0], Integer.parseInt(args[1]),
Integer.parseInt(args[2]));
System.out.println(grid.getName()+", "+ grid.getM()
+ ", " + grid.getV() + ", " + grid.getSize()+", " +
grid.entropy(8)+ ", " + grid.Lmin(64)
+ ", " + grid.Lmin(128)+ ", " + grid.Lmin(256)+
", " + grid.Lmin(512));
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}

}
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APPENDIX B

TABLE OF RESULTS

SCREEN Length Height size
VGA
42
32 672
SVGA
53
40 1060
WSVGA
68
40 1360
XGA
68
51 1734
XGA+
76
57 2166
WXGA
85
48 2040
WXGA
85
51 2167
WXGA
85
53 2252
SXGA
85
64 2720
SXGA
85
68 2890
HD
90
51 2295
HD
91
51 2320
SXGA+
93
70 3255
WXGA+
96
60 2880
HD+
106
60 3180
UXGA
106
80 4240
WSXGA+
112
70 3920
FHD
128
72 4608
WUXGA
128
80 5120
QWXGA
136
76 5168
WQHD
170
96 8160
WQXGA
170
106 9010

Lmin
Lmin
Lmin
Lmin
Entropy(8) H= 64
H= 128 H= 256 H= 512
75
7
14
27
55
80
6
13
25
51
83
6
12
25
49
86
6
12
24
48
88
6
12
23
46
87
6
12
23
47
88
6
12
23
46
89
6
11
23
46
91
6
11
22
45
91
6
11
22
45
89
6
11
23
46
89
6
11
23
46
93
5
11
22
44
91
6
11
22
45
93
6
11
22
44
96
5
11
21
42
95
5
11
21
43
97
5
11
21
42
98
5
10
21
42
98
5
10
21
42
103
5
10
20
39
105
5
10
19
39
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